The learning with errors (LWE) problem has become a central building block of modern cryptographic constructions. This work collects and presents hardness results for concrete instances of LWE. In particular, we discuss algorithms proposed in the literature and give the expected resources required to run them. We consider both generic instances of LWE as well as small secret variants. Since for several methods of solving LWE we require a lattice reduction step, we also review lattice reduction algorithms and use a rened model for estimating their running times. We also give concrete estimates for various families of LWE instances, provide a Sage module for computing these estimates and highlight gaps in the knowledge about algorithms for solving the LWE problem.
Contributions. The rst contribution of this survey is to gather and present algorithms available in the literature used for solving LWE. In particular, we identify three strategies for solving LWE and give the algorithms available in the literature for solving LWE via one of these strategies. While in recent years several such algorithms were proposed and analysed, most treatments of LWE do not consider these results when discussing its hardness. By providing an accessible survey on available techniques we hope to motivate research to push the state-of-the-art in this area forward.
We note that in most previous works the hardness of LWE is treated only asymptotically. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hide logarithmic and constant factors in the exponent of complexity expressions. For example, Arora and Ge [12] specify the complexity of their algorithm as 2Õ
, for some such that = . While such statements -separating essential from inessential factors -allow us to understand the behaviour of various families of algorithms and of the problem in general, they need to be re ned in order to gain insights into the concrete hardness of LWE. The importance of this could be seen, for example, when it comes to designing actual systems based on LWE. Here we must select parameters to ensure that the problem instance generated is hard with respect to a particular security parameter while still keeping parameters as small as possible for performance reasons. For this we must be able to identify the fastest known way of solving LWE with that choice of parameters and be assured that this attack takes 2 operations. The second contribution of this survey is hence that where possible we provide concrete estimates for how long it takes to solve LWE. Since for most algorithms no tight closed formulae are known expressing their complexities, the third contribution of this survey is that we provide a module for the Sage mathematics software [76] which, given the parameters of an LWE instance, outputs estimates for the concrete running time of the algorithms discussed in this survey. We also apply this estimator to various families of LWE parameters from the literature and discuss areas where the collective knowledge is limited in order to motivate further research. Instances. To this end we need to characterise LWE instances. In this survey we always let be a discrete Gaussian distribution on ℤ with centre zero and width parameter , denoted by D ℤ, . A discrete Gaussian distribution with centre and width parameter samples elements with a probability proportional to exp(− ( − ) 2 /( ) 2 ). The standard deviation of a continuous Gaussian with width parameter is = / 2 and we roughly have this relation when we discretise, as long as is bigger than the smoothing parameter (ℤ) of ℤ (see [28] ). For ease of analysis, some works (e.g., [52] ) treat the error terms as not too dissimilar from samples from a continuous Gaussian, and we join them in this approach whenever this occurs.
We then characterise LWE instances in the following way. (i) Typically, we have ≈ and = , i.e. ≈
1/2−
, for a small constant. Having > allows the reduction of GapSVP to LWE to go through [70] . In particular, Regev uses = 2 . Intuitively this is because a step in the reduction loses a factor of . Furthermore, if < then Arora and Ge's algorithm is subexponential [12] . In this survey, we simply pick = , ignoring the constant 2 as it does not a ect our estimates much. In this case we may characterise the instance by (and ).
(ii) The most generic characterisation is by , , . (iii) In some applications, the components of the secret s are not chosen uniformly at random from ℤ but instead we have the guarantee that they are all "small", e.g., s ( ) ∈ {0, 1}. In this case we characterise the instance by , , , where is the distribution of the s ( ) . In many applications, we are only given access to =Õ( ) samples. In this case, we would characterise the instance by , , , . However, in this work we will assume that we have access to as many samples as we require. This is a reasonable assumption because the hardness of the LWE problem itself is essentially independent of the number of samples [71] . This could be explained by the result that given a xed (polynomial) number of samples, one can generate arbitrarily many more (independent) samples, with only a slight worsening in the error [11, 37] . Structure. In Section 2 we give relevant tools which we will use later. In Section 3 we review lattice reduction algorithms as these will also be used later. In Section 4 we give the three main strategies for solving LWE. In Section 5 we describe the algorithms which can be used to solve LWE via a chosen strategy. In particular, we consider instances of LWE characterised both by , , and the special case = , = . In Section 6
we concentrate on the third characterisation of LWE: those instances with a small secret. In Section 7 we apply our estimator to parameter choices from the literature. Finally, in Section 8 we make some concluding remarks.
Notation and tools
Logarithms are base 2 if not stated otherwise. We write ln for the natural logarithm. We denote vectors in bold, e.g., a, and matrices in upper-case bold, e.g., A. By a ( ) we denote the -th component of a, i.e. a scalar.
In contrast, a is the -th element of a list of vectors. The concatenation of two vectors a and b is denoted (a ‖ b). We denote by ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ the usual dot product of two vectors and by ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ this dot product modulo . We write 2 ≤ < 3 for any constant such that there is an algorithm which multiplies matrices in O( ) operations for su ciently large . Hence, our di ers slightly from the de nition in [20] which hides logarithmic factors (cf. [68] ). Unless stated otherwise, we use ≈ to denote something su ciently close to equal that we treat it as equal for our estimates. Since we will use lattice reduction later on, we need some basic de nitions about lattices. A lattice in ℝ is a discrete additive subgroup. In this survey we restrict our attention to viewing a lattice (B) as being generated by a (non-unique) basis B = {b 0 , . . . , b −1 } ⊂ ℤ of linearly-independent integer vectors. The rank of the lattice is de ned to be the rank of the basis matrix B with rows consisting of the basis vectors. If the rank equals we say that is full-rank. We are only concerned with such lattices in this work and henceforth assume that the lattices we deal with are full-rank. In addition, we are only concerned with -ary lattices which are those such that ℤ ⊆ ⊆ ℤ . Note that every -ary lattice is full-rank. Throughout, we adopt the convention that a lattice is generated by integer combinations of row vectors, to match software conventions. The volume vol( ) of a full-rank lattice is the absolute value of the determinant of any basis of the lattice. The -th successive minimum of a lattice, ( ), is the radius of the smallest ball centred at the origin containing at least linearly independent lattice vectors. The Gaussian heuristic states that 1 ( ) ≈ /(2 ) vol( )
1/
. We adopt the convention that the rst non-zero vector, say b 0 , in a reduced lattice basis is the shortest vector in the basis.
We now give four lemmas which will be useful later. The rst shows that given samples from s, we can construct LWE instances where the secret vector follows the same distribution as the error. Proof. Take samples from s, and write
where
this matrix is invertible. Precompute A −1 0 and store it; this costs O( ) operations. Now, to produce samples of the form (a, ) = (a, ⟨a, e⟩
from s, and compute Given samples from s, , we may be able to construct LWE instances where the modulus is now for some particular < by modulus switching. This technique was initially introduced to speed-up homomorphic encryption [19] but can also be employed to reduce the cost of solving LWE in certain cases [8] . Modulus switching can be thought of as analogous to the di erence between computing with single instead of double precision oating point numbers, where switching refers to opting to compute in the lower precision of a machine oat. In the LWE context, for some < , modulus switching is considering an instance of LWE (mod ) as a scaled instance of LWE (mod ). This incurs a noise increase which is only small if s is small, so the technique can only be used for small secrets. The requirements on must be balanced. On the one hand, minimising will minimise the running time of most algorithms (see Section 6) . On the other hand, picking too small increases the noise level, which in general leads to a higher complexity for solving LWE. Below, we choose to ensure that ‖⟨ ⋅ a − ⌊ ⋅ a⌉, s⟩‖ ≈ ⋅ ‖ ‖ if s is small enough. This means that the new error term after modulus switching is essentially the previous error scaled. In particular, the new distribution is LWE with errors having standard deviation 2 / 2 + (1). Following [18, 19] we have the following lemma. is an inner product of small -dimensional vectors and thus approaches a discrete Gaussian as tends to in nity. Its standard deviation is /12 , since ⋅ a − ⌊ ⋅ a⌉ takes values ∈ (−0.5, 0.5]. We have that ⋅ is a scaled discrete Gaussian of standard deviation
Targeting ὔὔ ≈ ⋅ , i.e. that the standard deviations of both distributions are the same, we get
Since the standard deviations of ⋅ and ὔὔ are the same for this , the standard deviation of the new distribution is 2 / 2 + O(1) as claimed.
Following the literature, we assume that the new distribution output by the process described in Lemma 2.2 is s,D ℤ, 2 +1 , i.e. that the error is discrete Gaussian, even for relatively small . The following lemma shows the equivalence of Decision-LWE and Search-LWE. Search to decision is trivial: if search is solved, s is known, so = − ⟨a, s⟩ can be computed. The non-trivial direction is due to Regev [70] Proof. We show how ὔ nds the rst component s (0) of s; nding the other components is similar. For any ∈ ℤ consider the following transformation. Given a pair (a, ) as input to ὔ , let it output the pair (a + ( , 0, . . . , 0), + ) where ∈ ℤ is chosen uniformly at random. It is easy to see that this transformation takes the uniform distribution to itself. On the other hand suppose the input pair (a, ) is sampled from s, . If = s (0) then this transformation takes s, into itself. If ̸ = s (0) then this transformation takes s, to the uniform distribution. There are only polynomially many (namely ) possibilities for s (0) , so we can try all of them as possible values. For each value, let the output of ὔ be the input to . Then as can distinguish s, from uniform, it can tell whether = s (0) .
In what follows we will also make use of the following standard fact about the Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 2.4. Let denote the Gaussian distribution with standard deviation and mean zero. Then, for all
> 0, it holds that
Proof. For > ⋅ , we have /( ⋅ ) > 1. Hence, we have
Lattice reduction algorithms
Many algorithms for solving LWE rely on lattice reduction as the central step. Hence, in this section we brie y review lattice reduction algorithms and discuss the current state-of-a airs in terms of estimating their running time. Since this survey is concerned with discussing algorithms for solving LWE, this section is kept rather brief and the interested reader is directed to [23, 52, 58, 61, 62] for further details on lattices.
Lattice reduction algorithms can be viewed as a hierarchy: cases of BKZ [73] based on the block size parameter . For = 2 the algorithm runs in polynomial time but the reduced basis output will only be LLLreduced, i.e. it will only contain a short vector to within exponential factors of a shortest vector. When = , i.e. the full size of the basis, then the output basis would be HKZ (Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev) reduced. This is in some sense optimally reduced, but requires at least exponential runtime. Hence, when performing lattice reduction, one generally uses BKZ with some intermediary block size.
The quality of a basis output by a lattice reduction algorithm is characterised by the Hermite factor 0 , which is de ned such that the shortest non-zero vector b 0 in the output basis has the following property:
. We may also refer to 0 itself, and call it the root-Hermite factor. We call its logarithm to base 2 the log root-Hermite factor.
. LLL
LLL can be considered as a generalisation of the two-dimensional algorithm by Lagrange and sometimes attributed to Gauss (see for example [45] ). The output of the Lagrange/Gauss algorithm is a basis {b 0 , b 1 } such that ‖b 0 ‖ ≤ ‖b 1 ‖ and the Gram-Schmidt coe cient 1,0 ≤ 1 2
. In particular, ‖b 0 ‖ = 1 and ‖b 1 ‖ = 2 . The algorithm works by taking in a pair of vectors {b 0 , b 1 } arranged such that ‖b 0 ‖ ≤ ‖b 1 ‖ and then setting b 1 = b 1 − ⌊ 1,0 ⌉b 0 , then swapping the vectors and repeating until no more changes can be made. Thus, when this terminates, we must have
To extend into higher dimensions one would like to do something similar but the optimal way to do this is not clear because of the additional choice of directions. Notice that the Gauss algorithm ensures that
is not too small, in particular,
(see, e.g., [64] for more details). An LLL reduced basis satis es a relaxed general version of this:
for some ∈ ( Running time. It is well known the runtime of LLL is polynomial and indeed this was proved as it was introduced [50] . In particular, for an input basis where for all , ‖b ‖ < , LLL outputs an LLL-reduced basis in time O( 5+ log 2+ ) (using fast integer multiplication). In more recent variants, improvements have been made.
For example, one variant introduced by Nguyen and Stehlé called L2 [63] provably outputs an LLL-reduced basis in time O( 5+ log + 4+ log 2 ) (using fast integer multiplication). That is, one that only grows quadratically in log . Heuristically, variants of LLL achieve O( 3 log 2 ) (see [24] ).
Quality of output. LLL theoretically achieves a Hermite factor of (
(see [50] ). In practice, it behaves much better and a root-Hermite factor 0 of 1.0219 is reported in [29] . Implementations. LLL and its variants are implemented in many software packages, notably in NTL [74] , FLINT [43] and fplll [21] . The latter also implements L2.
. BKZ
The BKZ algorithm [73] requires an algorithm solving exact SVP in possibly smaller dimensions as a subroutine. The typical methods of doing this are computing the Voronoi cell of the lattice, sieving or enumeration [41] . Below we refer to running any of these algorithms as calling an SVP oracle. ; and this procedure carries on through the basis. The rst − + 1 blocks are all of size , and then after this point each block is one vector shorter than the previous block. The output basis of this process is another LLL reduced basis, which can be treated as a new input, and the whole process continues again, until a basis passes through unchanged, at which point the algorithm terminates.
An HKZ reduced basis {b 0 , . . . , b −1 } is a basis such that its Gram-Schmidt vectors b * satisfy ‖b
We can see that BKZ constructively achieves a basis with the following property: each block of size (e.g., b 0 , . . . , b −1 ), that is all the rst − + 1 blocks, is an HKZ reduced basis. Therefore, if = then the whole output basis is HKZ reduced. BKZ 2.0. Several improvements of BKZ have been suggested and their combination is often referred to as BKZ 2.0 [24] . These improvements are extreme pruning [30] , early termination, limiting the enumeration radius to the Gaussian heuristic and local block pre-processing. Extreme pruning takes place in the enumeration subroutine, and it works by exploring only certain branches in the search tree, with the hope that a short enough vector is still found, therefore decreasing the runtime. Early termination is based on the observation that the quality of the output basis increases more dramatically in the earlier rounds of BKZ. Therefore, continuing to reduce the lattice o ers diminishing returns in the basis quality, and early termination decreases the runtime while still returning a basis close to the desired quality. Local block pre-processing takes the form of running BKZ-ὔ with early termination for some value ὔ so that the local basis is more than merely LLL reduced. Quality of output. Assuming that the Gaussian heuristic and the geometric series assumption [72] hold for a lattice, Chen [23] gives a limiting value of the root-Hermite factor 0 achievable by BKZ as a function of the block size :
where is the volume of the unit ball in dimension . Experimental evidence suggests that we may apply the right-hand side of (1) as an estimate for 0 also when is nite.
The 'lattice rule of thumb' is often used to given an approximation for 0 for a given as 0 =
1/(2 )
. To ease analysis, this expression, in turn, is often approximated by 0 = 2 1/ (see [75] ). We note that depending on which estimate is used vastly di erent relations between and 0 are assumed. To illustrate this we plot predictions for 0 for block sizes 50 ≤ ≤ 250 in Figure 1 .
Assuming that (1) holds, we may conclude from Figure 1 that we do not need to consider the approximation
as it is always too pessimistic. The approximation 2 1/ is closer to the actually expected behaviour, but as we will show below it implies a simple sub-exponential algorithm for solving LWE via straightforward lattice reduction. Running time. The running time of BKZ is mainly determined by two factors: rstly, the time it takes to nd shortest or short enough vectors in lattices of dimension ; and secondly, the number of BKZ rounds needed. We assume CPU clock cycles as our basic unit to abstract from CPU clock speeds. If is the number of clock cycles it takes to solve SVP in dimension , we expect BKZ to take ⋅ ⋅ clock cycles. SVP oracles. As mentioned above, three main families of algorithms exist for nding shortest vectors [41] .
Computing the Voronoi cell of the lattice takes about 2 poly( ) memory by running enumeration on an LLL-reduced lattice (Fincke-Pohst), but can be also be done in O( ) operations and poly( ) memory by performing heavier preprocessing on the input lattice (Kannan) . Achieving O( ) was considered prohibitively expensive in practice until recently, but [59] proposed a variant which achieves O( ) with smaller overhead. Moreover, [79] showed that preprocessing local blocks with BKZ-O( ) before enumeration also reduces the complexity of BKZ-to
Estimating . No closed formula for the expected number of BKZ rounds is known. The best upper bound
is exponential, but after = 2 2 log many rounds, the quality of the basis is already very close to the nal output [42] . Asymptotic behaviour. Before we discuss existing estimates in the literature for the running time of BKZ, we brie y discuss the expected asymptotic behaviour of the algorithm. The 'lattice rule of thumb' puts the relation between the block size and 0 as 0 =
1/(2 )
, which implies / log = 1/(2 log 0 ). To solve this for we need the following technical lemma. Lemma 3.1. For ≥ 1, let ( ) = log( −1 ( )) with 0 ( ) = 2. De ne ∞ ( ) = lim →∞ ( ). If / log = and log ≥ 1 then ≥ ( ) for any ≥ 0. In particular, for log > 2, = ∞ ( ).
Proof. For the rst claim, notice that ≥ 0 ( ) = 2 as log ≥ 1. Furthermore, ≥ 1 ( ) = as / log = so ≥ . We also have ≥ 2 ( ) = log :
For the inductive step, suppose ≥ ( ). Then log ≥ log( ( )) and
So by induction, we have ≥ ( ). For the second claim, if log > 2, then = / log > 2. We now prove by induction that ( ) ≥ −1 ( ) for all ≥ 1. For the base case, we have 1 ( ) = > 2 = 0 ( ). For the inductive step, suppose ( ) ≥ −1 ( ). Then ( )
Thus we have that ( ) is an increasing sequence, and by the rst claim, it is bounded above by . So it is convergent and we may denote its limit by ∞ ( ). This satis es ∞ ( ) = log ( ∞ ( )) and so
Now, for ≥ 4, the function / log is one-to-one. Note that we have ( ) > 2 for all so also ∞ ( ) > 2. It remains to prove that ∞ ( ) ≥ 4, which implies ∞ ( ) = . To show this, we require some further properties of the function / log . Consider the solutions of the equation / log = 2. These are precisely = 2 and = 4. By di erentiating / log and evaluating at these values, and with the observation that / log is continuous for > 1, we can see that / log takes values below 2 precisely for 2 < < 4. But, / log > 2. So we must be in the region ≥ 4. So, / log is injective here and we may conclude ∞ ( ) = as required.
By Lemma 3.1, we have ≥ (1/(2 log 0 )). In particular,
Ignoring constants, this expression simpli es to − log(log 0 )/ log 0 . Since (1/(2 log 0 )) is an increasing sequence, we can lower bound the log of the time complexity of the BKZ algorithm as follows. 
Remark 3.3.
We typically have log 0 = (log / ) and so since / log = 1/(2 log 0 ) we have that
Since / log is injective for su ciently large (e.g., > 3), we can conclude = ( ) for su ciently large and . Therefore, in most cases considered in this work, the expressions in Corollary 3.2 could be given as O(
2 ), O( log ) and O( ) because we have large .
Existing estimates. The following estimates for the running time of BKZ exist in the literature.
Lindner and Peikert [52] give an estimate for the runtime (in seconds) of BKZ as
based on experiments with the implementation of BKZ in the NTL library [74] . That is, improvements such as extreme pruning, early termination, and local block pre-processing were not used. To convert the estimate to a more general metric, we may notice that it was derived from experiments performed on a computer running at 2.3 GHz. We can hence convert this to clock cycles, giving a runtime of clock cycles. It should be noted that this is a linear model, which does not t the actual implementation on BKZ in the NTL library as this uses an enumeration subroutine requiring 2
time. Moreover, as we will show below in Section 5.3, applying this model to predict the behaviour of BKZ leads to a subexponential algorithm for solving LWE. Albrecht et al. [6] use data points of Liu and Nguyen [54] to extrapolate a model similar to Lindner and Peikert's [52] and conclude the running time of BKZ 2.0 (in seconds) to be
They argue that for current implementations and estimates based on them the runtime of BKZ being nonlinear in log 0 is more tting than a linear model such as that of Lindner and Peikert. The analysis also gives a runtime in seconds on a 2.3 GHz computer, so we can convert this into clock cycles to give a runtime of We refer to this as the delta-squared model. It should be noted, though, that the running times on which this model is based were not independently veri ed which limits their utility. Note that this estimate drops the log 2 (log 0 ) factor compared to Corollary 3.2 and assumes that enumeration in BKZ 2.0 has a complexity of
. Chen and Nguyen provide a simulation algorithm for BKZ 2.0 [23, 24] for arbitrarily high block size, under the assumption that each block behaves as a random basis. The authors note that this assumption may not hold for block sizes < 50. The algorithm takes as input the logs of the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors belonging to the input matrix and a block size . It outputs the expected logs of the norms of the GramSchmidt vectors of the BKZ-reduced basis as well as the number of BKZ rounds needed. The simulation algorithm allows one to calculate what blocksize will be required to obtain the approximate 0 given by BKZ 2.0 (cf. [24, Table 2 ]). Chen and Nguyen assume the SVP is solved using a pruned enumeration and they estimate the upper bound of the cost of this, for various values of , in terms of number of nodes of the enumeration tree [24, Table 3 ]. The cost of BKZ is dominated by the cost of enumeration, and each round of BKZ costs "essentially − 1 enumeration calls" [24] (where is the dimension of the lattice). So the total cost of BKZ is estimated to be the number of rounds multiplied by − 1 multiplied by the cost of an enumeration call.
Van de Pol and Smart [77] consider the problem from the perspective of using BKZ to solve an LWE instance or some other computational problem in lattices. They assume one has a desired level of security 2 (a maximum number of operations an adversary can perform) and a given lattice dimension . These are used to nd the lowest 0 which can be achieved in 2 operations, minimising over possible choices of the block size and the number of rounds = ( , , ). This is in contrast to an approach where the parameters of the system correspond to a 0 which then implies a certain security level. They use a table of Chen and Nguyen [24, Table 3 ] to estimate the cost of one enumeration for a given and to calculate the total number of enumerations one can perform for this (to reach the maximum of 2 operations). Note that this means they do not consider block sizes > 250 as Chen and Nguyen do not give estimates for those. Smart and van de Pol remark that 0 seems to converge to a value depending only on , corroborating other results in the literature. They note further that the convergence is slower in higher dimension. The approach of van de Pol and Smart was later re ned in [51] . Estimates for . In Table 1 we list estimates for solving SVP in dimension which were derived as follows.
The rst row -labelled 'fplll' -was derived by calling the SVP function available in fplll 4.0.4 [21] for dimensions up to 53 and by tting 2 + + to the logs of these averaged running times.
The second row -labelled 'enum' -was derived by tting ⋅ log + + to [25, Table 4 ] (we note that these estimates were not independently veri ed) and assuming one enumeration costs 200 clock cycles as in [25] . We note that while BKZ 2.0 does perform local block preprocessing with BKZ-ὔ before calling the SVP oracle it is not clear if it as implemented in [25] achieves a complexity of
. This is because [25] does not give su cient details to decide if preprocessing was performed with ὔ = O( ). However, from a cryptanalytical perspective it is safer to assume it achieves this bound, which is why we chose to t the curve as we did. The third row is based on [48] expression. We brush over this di erence and simply estimate the cost of sieving as 2 0.3366 + operations where we derive the additive constant from timings derived from practical experiments in [48] . We note that [49] does not include any experimental results. Hence, we cannot estimate when the cost hidden in the + ( ) term is small enough. Indeed, estimating the cost of sieving in practice is stressed as an open problem in [49] .
To t curves we used Sage's function nd_ t [76] which calls SciPy's function scipy.optimize.leastsq [44] which in turn uses MINPACK's lmdif [60] . Overall. By setting = 2 2 log , we assume that running BKZ for block size and dimension costs ( 3 2 log ) ⋅ CPU cycles where is taken from Table 1 based on how the SVP oracle is instantiated.
Implementations. BKZ is implemented in NTL [74] and fplll [21] . Neither of these implementations incorporate all techniques which are collectively known as BKZ 2.0. Hence, both implementations have a complexity of 2
. However, the next version of fplll implements recursive local block preprocessing with BKZ [5] .
. Choosing the number of samples
In some of the algorithms below we will have a choice of which lattice to consider. In particular, the situation will arise where our task is to nd a vector with a target norm in a lattice with a given volume vol( ) but variable dimension. Given this degree of freedom, we will have to choose an optimal subdimension to perform lattice reduction on. To nd this optimal subdimension we need to nd such that
is minimised. If, as in many applications below, vol( ) = this becomes ‖v‖ = 0 / , then = log log 0 is the optimal subdimension to consider [58] . This 'optimal subdimension' is also often heuristically chosen even where the above relation between volume and dimension does not hold. In [77] van de Pol and Smart choose based on the best 0 which can be obtained for a given security level. In one example the dimension they choose is similar to the 'optimal subdimension'.
Strategies
In this section we discuss three strategies for solving LWE: solving Decision-LWE by nding a short vector v such that ⟨v, a⟩ = 0; solving Search-LWE by nding a short such that ⟨a, x⟩ = − for some unknown x; or solving Search-LWE by nding an s ὔ such that ⟨a, s ὔ ⟩ is close to . All algorithms in Section 5 follow one of these strategies.
. Short integer solutions (SIS)
In order to distinguish the case where samples (A, c) either follow s, , and hence satisfy c = As + e with e ( ) ← $ D ℤ, ; or c is uniformly random, we can try to nd a short vector v such that v ⋅ A = 0. Expressed as a lattice problem, we aim to nd a vector v in the scaled (by ) dual lattice of the lattice generated by A, i.e. the lattice = {w ∈ ℤ | wA ≡ 0 mod }, which is exactly solving the short integer solutions (SIS) problem [2] . Consider ⟨v, c⟩. If c = As + e then ⟨v, c⟩ = ⟨v, e⟩ which follows a Gaussian distribution over ℤ considered modulo . In particular, it often returns small samples as both v and e are small. On the other hand, if c is uniform then ⟨v, c⟩ is uniform on ℤ . So we may distinguish these two cases, thus solving Decision-LWE. We must however ensure ‖v‖ is suitably short. If ‖v‖ is too large then the (Gaussian) distribution of ⟨v, e⟩ will be too at to distinguish from random. In particular, we have the following lemma. Lemma 4.1 ([52] ). Given an LWE instance characterised by , , and a vector v of length ‖v‖ in the scaled dual lattice = {w ∈ ℤ | wA ≡ 0 mod }, the advantage of distinguishing ⟨v, e⟩ from random is close to exp(− (‖v‖ ⋅ ) 2 ).
Remark 4.2.
For example, Stehlé [75] states that a suitably short choice to distinguish s, from random is ‖v‖ ⋅ ≤ , i.e. ‖v‖ = 1/ . By Lemma 4.1, this results in an advantage of about 1/23 to distinguish correctly.
We note that depending on the algorithm used to obtain the short vector v, it may be advantageous to accept a longer vector as output. This decreases the distinguishing advantage , but then running the algorithm about 1/ 2 times will achieve a success probability close to 1 by the Cherno bound [26] . This may be faster than the alternative, which uses fewer vectors (runs of the algorithm) at a higher success probability, but takes signi cantly longer to obtain these shorter vectors. Corollary 4.3. To obtain a probability of success in solving an LWE instance parametrised by , and via the SIS strategy, we require a vector v of norm ‖v‖
Methods of nding a short vector in the dual lattice, or in a lattice generally, will be described in the sections below. For ease of exposition we let ( ) denote ln(1/ )/ .
. Bounded distance decoding (BDD)
Given samples (A, c = As + e) following s, we may observe that c is close to a linear combination of the columns of A. Furthermore, since the noise is Gaussian, almost all of the noise is within, say, three times the standard deviation (that is, 3 / 2 ) from 0. Consider the lattice spanned by the columns of A. We can see that c is a point which is bounded in distance from a lattice point w = As. Hence, we may view the LWE instance as a bounded distance decoding (BDD) problem instance in this lattice. This problem is as follows: given a basis of a lattice, a target vector, and a bound on the distance from the target to the lattice, nd a lattice vector within that bound of the target vector. In this case, our solution to the BDD problem would be the lattice point w, from which we may then use linear algebra to recover s and therefore solve Search-LWE. (In the event A is not invertible, call for more samples until it is.) Again, depending on the algorithm, it may be advantageous to accept a lower success probability . Then, approximately log(1 − ὔ )/ log(1 − ) iterations will achieve a success probability close to the target
. Solving for s
A variant of the previous strategy is to search for a suitable s directly such that ‖As − c‖ is small. This literally solves Search-LWE. While this and the previous technique are related by simple linear algebra, i.e. knowing e trivially allows to recover s and vice versa, they di er in which of e or s they target. For example, the Arora-Ge algorithm (cf. Section 5.6) directly recovers s.
Algorithms . Exhaustive search
Exhaustive search directly solves for s as in Section 4.3. Theorem 5.1. The time complexity of solving Search-LWE with success probability with exhaustive search is ⋅ (2 + 1) ⋅ 2 = 2 log (2 +1)+log +1+log . The memory complexity is , the sample complexity is + with = log(1 − ) − log(2 + 1) log (2 ) for some small parameter = ( log ).
Proof. Consider {− , . . . , } for = ( log ). By Lemma 2.4, an LWE sample has error which falls in this range with overwhelming probability. Apply Lemma 2.1 to obtain an LWE instance with s ( ) ← $ D ℤ, , i.e. the secret is distributed the same as the error. We are therefore able to estimate the size of each component of the secret as |s ( ) | ≤ . Therefore, to check all possible secrets we must enumerate approximately (2 + 1)
vectors. For each vector we perform about 2 operations in ℤ when computing the inner product.
We need samples to apply Lemma 2.1 (if these samples do not have full rank, pick samples again from the overall set of all samples). We know that the correct s will produce = ⟨a , s⟩ − with ∈ {− , . . . , } with overwhelming probability. Wrong guesses s ὔ will produce random elements in ℤ which land within the acceptable range with probability ≤ (⌈2 ⌉ + 1)/ ≈ 2 . For the wrong guess s ὔ to pass the test it must pass for all samples, which happens with probability (2 ) . There are (2 + 1) − 1 wrong choices for s. By the union bound, we will hence accept a false positive with probability ≤ (2 ) ⋅ (2 + 1) . Choosing
this happens with a probability ≤ . Picking = 1 − to ensure that is su ciently small nishes the proof. The memory complexity is . The sample complexity is + with = log (1 − ) − log (2 + 1)
Remark 5.3. The complexity is independent of and but depends on their product and . Meet-in-the-middle. As mentioned in [14] there is also a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) algorithm. MITM also directly solves for s as in Section 4.3. This is a time-memory trade-o and hence a faster method than a naive brute force but at the cost of an increased requirement on memory. Proof. Consider {− , . . . , } for = ( log ). By Lemma 2.4, an LWE sample has error which falls in this range with overwhelming probability. Apply Lemma 2.1 to obtain an LWE instance with
the secret is distributed the same as the error. This costs samples. Given samples (a , ⟨a , s⟩ + ), split a = a ‖ a in half and for each possibility s of the rst half of s compute the inner product of the rst half of a and s . Let the output of guess s ∈ ℤ for the second half of the secret compute the inner product of the second half of each a with s and then subtract from , to obtain the vector With overwhelming probability we will have ∈ {− , . . . , } for 0 ≤ < . Therefore
A candidate should be rejected if the distance between u s and v s is more than ( ) and should be accepted otherwise. This means that with overwhelming probability the algorithm will identify the correct secret as long as the error does not cause a wrap around mod on any component. That is, over the integers we have
for constants ℎ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. A wrap around mod on one component corresponds to ℎ = ±1 on that component, but we require that ℎ = 0 on all components (for our lexicographical ordering to work). The above is equivalent on each component to = + + ℎ where = ⟨a , s⟩ mod . We have that ℎ = ±1 will not occur whenever is not in a band of width either side of , but may occur otherwise. So we can bound the probability that a correct secret is rejected because of a wrap around error by the probability that at least one of the components has ∈ [0, ] ∪ [ − , ). The probability that one component has
) is 2 / = 2 so by the union bound the probability that at least one of the com-
We want to bound so that this event only happens with probability at most 1/ for some constant , i.e. (2 ) < 1/ .
Consider now the chance of a false positive, i.e. a wrong candidate secret s being suggested for some candidate s . Since a is uniformly random, for any s , we have that u s is essentially a random vector where each component takes one of values. The chance of a wrong candidate s producing a v s matching to a given u s to within distance ( ) is the chance of getting to within ± on every component. Therefore the chance of a false positive is ((⌈2 ⌉ + 1)/ ) ≈ (2 ) There are (2 + 1) /2 − 1 wrong choices for s . We hence expect to test (2 ) ⋅ (2 + 1)
candidates per s and thus require 
. BKW
The BKW (Blum, Kalai, Wasserman) algorithm was introduced in [16] and shows that subexponential algorithms exist for learning parity functions in the presence of noise: the BKW algorithm solves the LPN problem (learning parity with noise) in time 2
. BKW can be adapted to solve LWE [70] and the complexity of this has been studied in [6] . In particular, BKW solves LWE via the SIS strategy (cf. Section 4.1).
To solve with this strategy, given samples (A, c) following s, , we require short vectors v in the scaled (by ) dual lattice of the lattice generated by the rows of A. BKW constructs these by adding elements from tables with entries each, where each table is used to nd collisions on components of a (a row of A).
In more detail, BKW constructs the v as follows. Given a sample a, BKW splits the components into blocks each of width . There are stages of the algorithm in which the algorithm creates tables by searching for collisions in the appropriate coe cients of a. In the rst stage after an appropriate number of samples we obtain two vectors which agree on a (0) , . . . , a ( −1) . The algorithm will then take these and subtract them producing a row with a (0) = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = a ( −1) = 0 which is stored for use in the next stage (considering a ( ) , . . . , a (2 −1) ).
The v are of length 2 . In the rst stage, suppose we nd a collision with the rst components. Adding those vectors clearing the rst components in a produces a v candidate of length 2 as we are adding two vectors. Moving on to the next stage, two such vectors are added to clear the next columns, resulting in a v candidate of length 2 2 , and so on for all stages. The algorithm maintains tables of size where = / and its running time is typically dominated by this magnitude. In general, we have the following complexity for solving Decision-LWE with BKW.¹ Theorem 5.6 ([6] ). Let (a , ) be samples following s, or a uniform distribution on ℤ × ℤ , 0 < ≤ be a parameter, 0 < < 1 the targeted success rate and = / the addition depth. Then, the expected cost of the BKW algorithm to distinguish s, from random with success probability is
additions/subtractions in ℤ to produce elimination tables, To pick and , recall from Remark 4.2 that in order to distinguish s, from random using SIS an appropriately short choice for v is ‖v ‖ ⋅ = 2 ⋅ ≤ hence a suitable choice for is ≤ log( −2 ). Remark 5.9. It is easy to see that the complexity of the BKW algorithm is determined by and and not or . However as grows the leading coe cient of the complexity approaches 1/2 as 1/ vanishes. Note, however, that this strategy of picking and is not optimal. These choices, which produce an easy, closed form for the complexity, ensure that = poly( ), which implies that almost all time is spent constructing 'elimination tables', whereas the second step of the algorithm -producing candidates for distinguishing -is very e cient. A better strategy is to balance both steps, i.e. to nd and such that
Corollary 5.7 ([6]). Let
By balancing both sides we may reduce the complexity of the BKW algorithm to O(2 ( log /(2 log − )) ) = 2
for some constant . This can make a signi cant di erence for picking concrete parameters. The search variant of BKW algorithm as given in [6] was later improved by Duc, Tramèr and Vaudenay [27] by using a discrete Fourier transform to recover a correct subset of components of s. In particular, Duc et al. arrive at the following complexity result. The time complexity to recover the secret s with probability at least is 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 where
is the number of additions in ℤ to produce tables,
is the number of additions in ℤ to recover s,
is the number of operations in ℂ to prepare and compute the discrete Fourier transforms, and
is the number of operations in ℤ for back substitution. Furthermore we require ( − 1) 
elements in ℤ and elements in ℂ.
A reference implementation of the BKW algorithm for LWE as described in [6] is available as [3] .
. Using lattice reduction to distinguish
Lattice reduction is another means to nd short vectors in the scaled dual lattice, enabling us to solve LWE via the SIS strategy. Again, we consider the scaled dual lattice = {w ∈ ℤ | wA ≡ 0 mod }. To construct this lattice from a given A ∈ ℤ × : compute a basis B for the nullspace of A over ℤ , lift to ℤ and extend by I ∈ ℤ × to make it -ary and compute a basis for . The lattice has dimension , and with high probability rank and volume vol( ) = (see [58] ).
By our convention lattice reduction will return the shortest non-zero vector b 0 it found as the rst vector of a reduced basis, which by de nition is a short vector in , so that b 0 A = 0 mod . Heuristically, for a good enough output basis all vectors could be used, as they will all be somewhat short, i.e. not too dissimilar in length from each other.
Lemma 5.12. Let an LWE instance be parametrised by , , . Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
can distinguish s, with probability .
Proof. With high probability vol( ) = and by de nition the Hermite factor is 0 = ‖v‖/ vol( ) 1 so we have ‖v‖ = 0 . On the other hand, we require ‖v‖ = 1 ( ) by Corollary 4.3. By Section 3.3 the optimal subdimension which minimises the quantity 0 is = log / log 0 . Since we assume we can choose any number of samples , we always choose to use this optimal subdimension. Rearranging with this value of , we obtain Proof. We have
( ) log log 0 log 0 + log / log 0 log = − 1 2 log + log ( ) log log log 0 + log = log log 0 − 1 2 log + log ( ) 2 log = log log 0 − 1 2 log + log ( ) 2 log
) log + log ( )) = log log 0 (2 log )
) log + log ( )) 2 = log log 0 4 log
) log + log ( )) 2 4 log = log 0 .
Remark 5.14. Assuming = and = we can see that for large and hence large , lattice reduction becomes easier, as we get a larger 0 . Contrasting this with BKW, we can see while it is somewhat competitive in time complexity with lattice reduction for small , it is much worse than the latter for large as they are, for example, used in homomorphic encryption schemes [35] (cf. Section 7).
Having established the target 0 , we can combine it with estimates about lattice reduction running times from Section 3.2. In Table 2 we list estimates for how long it would take lattice reduction algorithms to achieve our target 0 for ( ) = 1, i.e. ≈ 1/23.
Considering the right-most column of Table 2 it is clear that both the Lindner-Peikert model as well as the simpli ed lattice rule of thumb would predict a subexponential running time for solving LWE with SIS. Since this is considered not to be the case, we may discount these approximations as too optimistic.
As pointed out in Section 4.1 above, the strategy as discussed so far is not optimal. Given access to suciently many samples it is usually bene cial to run lattice reduction for a smaller target success probability ὔ and to repeat this process about 1/( ὔ ) 2 times to boost the overall success probability to a success probability close to 1. 
. Decoding approach
This approach solves LWE by solving the BDD problem (cf. [52] ). The most basic way of solving a BDD instance is using Babai's nearest plane algorithm [13] . This approach can be summarised as follows: let there be samples of an LWE instance parametrised by , , so we have a set of samples (A, c). Perform lattice reduction on the lattice (A ) to obtain a new basis B for this lattice, where the quality of this basis is characterised as usual by the root-Hermite factor 0 . Babai's nearest plane algorithm works by recursively computing the closest vector on the sublattice spanned by subsets of the Gram-Schmidt vectors b * . This recovers the vector s with probability
under the assumption that sampling from the discrete Gaussian is approximately the same as sampling from a continuous Gaussian [52] . The probability the nearest plane algorithm nds the vector s is given by the probability that the error vector e lies in the parallelepiped s + P(B * ). So, it can be seen that in this approach the success probability is determined by the quality of the lattice reduction. Lindner and Peikert nearest plane. Lindner and Peikert [52] suggest an alteration of Babai's algorithm, designed to widen the fundamental parallelepiped in the direction of b * by a factor of some ∈ ℤ >0 , thereby increasing the chance of e falling inside it. This will nd multiple solutions, which can be searched through exhaustively to nd the correct solution.
This modi es the success probability to
There is no obvious way to analytically determine the optimal to achieve a desired success probability. However, Lindner and Peikert suggest a simple heuristic method in which are chosen to maximise min 1≤ ≤ ( ⋅ ‖b * ‖). This can be shown to return optimal values if we restrict our to powers of 2 only. Since erf(2 )/ erf( ) > erf(2 )/ erf( ) for all 0 < < , clearly the optimal value is obtained by doubling whenever ⋅ ‖b ‖ is minimal. Therefore, maximising the minimum of the values ⋅ ‖b ‖ is optimal for powers of 2.
Given , , and as above, let
such that equation (2) is at least where node is the number of clock cycles it takes to visit one node. Then the time for a decoding approach to achieve a success probability could be determined as
Hence, on the one hand, with a more reduced basis, the values of can be smaller, so the nearest plane algorithm requires less time. On the other hand, the lattice reduction takes signi cantly more time for smaller approximation factors.
We note that in [52, Figure 4 ] it appears as though this quantity has not been optimised. The authors nd values for 0 for which the time of a decoding approach is less than an equivalent distinguishing approach (cf. Section 5.3), but these values are not necessarily optimal, i.e. the lattice reduction step and the decoding step are not always balanced.
We note that we may opt to run the algorithm many times with a lower advantage. This typically reduces the overall complexity. Solving BDD by enumeration: An update (Liu, Nguyen). Liu and Nguyen [54] note that the Lindner-Peikert algorithm (as well as Babai's) can be viewed as a form of pruned enumeration, but with a di erent rule to Gama, Nguyen and Regev's pruned enumeration [30] . Namely, let v be a node and t be a target vector. GNR pruning keeps nodes with bounded projections whereas the Lindner-Peikert algorithm keeps nodes with bounded coordinates, in particular | (v − t)| ≤ ‖b * ‖/2 where (x) = ⟨x, b * ⟩/‖b * ‖. Liu and Nguyen note that this can be generalised to arbitrary bounds on coordinates, | (v − t)| ≤ for some parameters not necessarily dependent on the ‖b * ‖.
Due to these similarities between the Lindner-Peikert method and pruning techniques, Liu and Nguyen implement a variant of the Lindner-Peikert algorithm in the context of pruning algorithms, using arbitrary . They also randomise the input basis, allowing them to repeat the algorithm multiple times, which has the result of increasing both the runtime and success probability linearly. Since we assume access to as many samples as required, we do not rely on rerandomisation when estimating complexity. These two factors result in more exibility in tuning the parameters, and improved results for solving BDD.
However, instead of using the enumeration framework as simply a method to improve the algorithm of Lindner and Peikert, Liu and Nguyen go on to directly apply pruned enumeration to solve BDD. This follows the earlier work of Gama, Nguyen and Regev [30] , and uses linear pruning in which the bounds = / are used. Over the same parameters used in [52] , this linear pruning is shown to improve on both the original nearest plane algorithm and the improved variant. Runtime analysis. In any lattice decoding approach, the runtime is determined by balancing the lattice reduction step against the nal step which enumerates possible solutions and outputs an answer with a certain probability. For Babai's algorithm, the runtime is determined by calculating the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisationwhich can be done with oating point arithmetic in O( 3 ). If using either of the extensions to Babai's algorithm this is still a component, but the main factor determining the runtime is the number of points which are calculated. Similarly, if using a form of enumeration, we are mostly interested in how many points are enumerated. Therefore, to calculate the runtime of the BDD approach, we simplify the various enumeration algorithms to two expressions: the time it takes to enumerate one point; and the success probability for a certain number of enumerations.
For seconds per enumeration. In our estimator (cf. Section 7) we assume node = 2 15.1 . Calculating the success probability is harder. For nearest plane, we can use equation (2), but we still need to determine the optimal values for for which we do not know a closed formula. In practice, though, we can follow Lindner and Peikert's strategy of increasing one by one. For enumeration and pruning, we need to use the method as used in [54] , which experimentally calculates the success probability by sampling.
The most signi cant factor a ecting the success probability is the quality of the reduced basis which is provided (i.e. what value 0 is achieved). For example, Babai's algorithm without a preceding lattice reduction only gives solutions up to an exponential factor. In a sense, the methods proposed here for performing a decoding approach can be seen as a way to halt the lattice reduction when it is possible to obtain a solution with a reasonable success probability, and optionally repeating to increase the probability of solving the problem. The overall runtime is then calculated by estimating the optimal time to halt the reduction and attempt to solve. and 0 = 1.0083 whereas the randomised NP used by Liu and Nguyen is able to perform the decoding approach using a lattice reduction with 0 = 1.0077 and = 2 −12 . This lattice reduction takes 2 65.6 seconds in the Lindner-Peikert model for lattice reduction. Our estimator suggests = 2 −15 and 0 = 1.0077566 which implies a lattice reduction cost of 2 66.48 seconds also in the Lindner-Peikert model (for compatibility).
We note that these improvements depend on balancing many parameters in an optimal way. Calculating the success probability can only be done numerically, and optimising parameters requires many computations. Our estimator (cf. Section 7) does not provide a routine for estimating the cost using [54] but we restrict our attention to [52] which gives comparable results and is easier to estimate.
. Reducing BDD to uSVP
Albrecht, Fitzpatrick and Göpfert [10] consider the complexity of solving LWE by reducing BDD to uSVP (unique shortest vector problem). Formally, the -uSVP problem is as follows: given a lattice such that 2 ( ) > 1 ( ), nd a shortest non-zero vector in .
To reduce BDD to uSVP Kannan's embedding technique [46] is used. The idea is to embed the lattice (A) = {Au | u ∈ ℤ } generated by the columns of the LWE instance (and our usual lattice for consideration when solving with the BDD strategy) into a higher-dimensional lattice (B) with -uSVP structure. That is, B is constructed as B = Ã 0 c , whereÃ is a basis for the -ary lattice spanned by the columns of A. Let y ∈ , for some lattice , be the closest lattice point to some point x, i.e. the point minimising ‖x − y‖. We can then de ne the distance from x to the lattice , dist(x, ), as this length. If the embedding factor = dist(c, (A)) < 1 ( (A))/(2 ) then (B) contains a -unique shortest vector, c ὔ = (e, − ) (see [56] ), from which we can take the rst components to recover e, hence solving the BDD instance.
To solve a -uSVP instance, we may reduce the problem to -HSVP (Hermite shortest vector problem). Let = 2 . Lovász [55] showed that any algorithm which can solve -HSVP, such as a lattice reduction algorithm, can be used linearly many times to solve approximate SVP with approximation factor 2 . Intuitively, a lattice with uSVP structure has one direction in which its shortest vector is somewhat shorter than all other directions. A su ciently precise lattice reduction algorithm (for example) can produce a vector so short it must be in this special direction. More precisely, a solution to 2 -approximate SVP would be a vector v such that ‖v‖ ≤ 2 1 ( ). On the other hand, any vector w which is not the shortest (and independent of the shortest vector) satis es ‖w‖ ≥ 2 ( ) > 2 1 ( ). So, we must have v is a multiple of a shortest vector, and hence we have solved 2 -uSVP. Ling et al. [53] show that whenever > , for the dimension of the lattice, this result can be improved. They show that any algorithm solving -HSVP can be used to solve -uSVP, where ≈ .
The above are theoretical results. In practice, an algorithm solving HSVP will solve uSVP instances where the gap is 2 ( ) > 0 1 ( ) with some probability depending on (see [29] ). The value is taken to be a constant, which is experimentally derived in [29] and which depends on both the nature of the lattices considered, the lattice reduction algorithm used and the target success rate.
To estimate the time complexity of this approach we rstly must establish and , which depend on how we choose the embedding factor . We may have = ‖e‖ or < ‖e‖.
Suppose rstly that = ‖e‖. We will need the following lemma from [10] . 
1/(2 )
ὔ and so we require a 0 determined by
. The determination of is discussed at length in [10] but we have that ≤ 0.4 (depending on the algorithm) for a success probability of 0.1 based on the experimental results in [10, 29] . We stress that no data is publicly available on for smaller success probabilities. In [10] it is shown that for a xed 0 the optimal subdimension is = log / log 0 as in Section 3.3. We may use this to determine 0 using the expression above (where for simplicity we assume equality).
Lemma 5.18. Given an LWE instance characterised by , , . Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
solves LWE with success probability greater than
for some ὔ > 1 and some xed ≤ 1, and 0 < < 1 as a function of .
Proof. From the above discussion, and assuming for simplicity an equality, we require a 0 determined by the following equation:
1− log / log 0 1 2 = ὔ log / log 0 0 2 To avoid notational con ict we refer to their constant > 1 as a constant ὔ > 1 and we replace their for the width parameter of the Gaussian with our .
Rearranging, we obtain 1 − log / log 0 log + log 1 2 = log ( ὔ ) + log log 0 log 0 log / log 0 − log / log 0 log − log log 0 log 0 = log ( ὔ ) − log 1 2 log / log 0 − log / log 0 log − log log 0 log 0 = log ὔ 2 log log 0 log ὔ 2 = 2 log log log 0 log
Finally, the success probability is computed as the probability the gap is as required in Lemma 5.17 multiplied by the success probability of our algorithm . ) log − log (
for some ὔ ≈ 1 and some xed ≤ 1 and 0 < < 1 as a function of .
Comparing Corollary 5.19 with Corollary 5.13 we nd that solving LWE via BDD by reducing to uSVP is more e cient than solving LWE via one call to an algorithm solving SIS whenever log(1/( 2 )) > log( ( )) under the condition that ≈ so that the success probabilities are equal in both cases. However, using Kannan's embedding is not necessarily more e cient than the decoding approach discussed in Section 5.4, as the following example highlights. clock cycles for performing this lattice reduction. In contrast, performing the decoding approach from Section 5.4 is predicted to cost 2 172 clock cycles overall to perform lattice reduction which achieves root-Hermite factor 0 = 1.005198 and to run the nal decoding stage. Finally, suppose < ‖e‖. In this case no e cient method for determining 2 / 1 is known. The assumption in [10] which attempts to overcome this is that the same size of gap is required as it is in the case that = ‖e‖. A modi ed value for , denoted ὔ , is introduced which relates to the gap from the case = when actually computing with = 1. Setting = 1 is typically more e cient than = ‖e‖ and we have ὔ ≈ 0.3, see [10] for details.
.
Arora-Ge and Gröbner bases
Arora and Ge proposed an alternative approach to solving Search-LWE by setting up a system of noise-free non-linear polynomials of which the secret s is a root [12] . This approach solves for s directly.
In particular, [12] o ers an algorithm for solving Search-LWE in time 2Õ
, where is a constant such that = . The algorithm proceeds by assuming that the error always falls in the range [− , ] for some ∈ ℤ such that = 2 + 1 < . This follows from the chance of falling outside this interval dropping exponentially fast (cf. Lemma 2.4). Polynomials are constructed from the observation that the error, when falling in this range, is always a root of the polynomial ( ) = ∏ =1 ( + )( − ). Then, we know the secret s is a root of (a ⋅ x − ) constructed from LWE samples. In the Arora-Ge algorithm the system of non-linear equations constructed this way is solved by replacing each monomial with a new variable and solving the resulting linear system. However, this means that we need O( 2 +1 ) samples. As we increase the number of samples, we increase the probability that the error falls outside of the interval [− , ]. We then have to increase the range, leading to a larger degree, which requires even more samples. Balancing these two requirements of keeping the degree low and acquiring enough samples, the overall complexity is given by the following result. Remark 5.22. Specialising to = the complexity is O(2 (2+ ) log log ). In this case, the Arora-Ge algorithm is asymptotically slower than the BKW algorithm and lattice reduction if sieving is used to implement the SVP oracle, but asymptotically faster than lattice reduction if enumeration is used to implement the SVP oracle.
This can be improved by using Gröbner basis techniques [7] . In particular, to solve via linearisation as in [12] , we require O( ) equations, but Gröbner basis algorithms will work when fewer equations than this are available at the cost of a more expensive solving step. In particular, the complexity of computing a Gröbner
where reg is the degree of regularity of the ideal I spanned by the polynomials. The degree reg is the index of the rst non-positive coe cient of the Hilbert series expansion of the ideal I. In general, it is hard to compute the Hilbert series, but for semi-regular sequences, it has an easy form. A semi-regular sequence of polynomials of degree in variables is a sequences with the following Hilbert series:
It is assumed that random systems behave like semi-regular sequences. A justi cation as to why this is a reasonable assumption is given in [7] . Thus, assuming our non-linear equations behave like random equations of the same degree, we can estimate the cost of solving LWE by expanding this power series until the rst non-positive coe cient. In particular, assuming = we get: Theorem 5.23 ([7] Hence, for = applying Gröbner basis algorithms is in the same complexity class as the BKW algorithm or lattice reduction when sieving implements the SVP oracle, albeit with a larger leading constant in the exponent. Remark 5.24. The complexity depends on , which corresponds to the degree, and , which corresponds to the number of variables. Adjusting while keeping the same will not a ect the runtime.
Small secret variants
In several applications based on LWE, the secret s is not chosen uniformly at random from ℤ but instead chosen from a di erent distribution where all the components s ( ) are "small", e.g., they are chosen from {0, 1} or {−1, 0, 1}. In this section we consider the complexity of solving LWE in this special case. We characterise an instance by , , , where is the distribution of s ( ) . We note that there is a gap between security reductions and the best known algorithms for solving LWE with binary secrets. On the one hand, theoretical results show that for an LWE instance with a binary secret to be as hard as general LWE in dimension a dimension of log is su cient [18, 57] . On the other hand, the best known algorithms for solving LWE with a binary secret from [14] manages to solve LWE instances with a binary secret and in dimension log log in about the same complexity as it would take to solve a standard LWE instance in dimension . Hence, based on the currently best known attacks we would conclude that we only need to increase the dimension to log log instead of log . Hence, there is room for improvement either for algorithms or for security reductions.
. Exhaustive search
In Section 5.1 above we saw that exhaustive search can be solved by checking all the vectors within a sphere of radius , for some small parameter = ( log ), which is essentially the size of the secret. Even without explicitly knowing , we can restrict our search to the support of , for example {−1, 0, 1}. We can simply check all possible s with s ( ) chosen from this set. Then by the same argument as in Theorem 5.1, exhaustive search will take time ⋅ 3 ⋅ (2 ) = 2 log 3+log +1+log if s ( ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. As observed in [14] we can also combine exhaustive search with other algorithms to improve the complexity by guessing, say, components of the secret and then running our algorithm on the reduced small secret LWE instance of dimension − . With this strategy any algorithm discussed below can be turned into an algorithm which has at most the cost of exhaustive search. MITM. By exactly the same argument as in Theorem 5.4, whatever time we would expect it to take to solve exhaustive search (which depends on ), we may achieve essentially the same speed up as we would do applying a meet-in-the-middle strategy to a general LWE instance. So, if the components s ( ) are selected from {−1, 0, 1} then an MITM strategy will take time O(3 /2 ) and require poly( ) ⋅ 3 /2 memory.
. Modulus switching for lattice reduction
For an LWE instance parametrised by , , and with a small secret, we may apply modulus switching and consider the instance mod where < . This allows for a larger 0 than would be required for an instance parametrised by the same , , and with a secret where s ( ) is chosen at random from ℤ . After modulus switching, the transformed instance has an error which is slightly larger and its distribution is no longer exactly a discrete Gaussian. Nonetheless, heuristically, algorithms which solve LWE still solve these LWE-like problem instances and so we assume that after modulus switching, we have an LWE instance characterised by , 2 and . So, when we have a small secret we may obtain a speed up by modulus switching before performing lattice reduction (for example, as described in Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5).
As an example we consider distinguishing LWE by lattice reduction as in Section 5.3. As with a general secret, we assume the size of the small vector we aim to output is ‖v‖ = 
Proof. Using Lemma 2.2, modulus switch and transform the LWE instance (a, ) ∈ ℤ × ℤ into an LWE instance in ℤ × ℤ . Now the instance is parametrised by , , 2 and by the same argument as in Lemma 5.12 we require 0 = 2
2 /(4 log ) . Table 5 .
model block size log clock cycles enum sieve Table 5 . Estimated clock cycles needed to mount a lattice reduction attack, parametrised as above, when using modulus switching.
. Bai and Galbraith's embedding
Bai and Galbraith [14] show that for binary secret (that is, s ( ) ← {0, 1} or s ( ) ← {−1, 0, 1}) we may embed our LWE lattice into a di erent lattice with uSVP structure than the one considered in Section 5.5. Let ὔ = + .
The lattice is then = {v ∈ ℤ ὔ | A ὔ v ≡ 0 mod } where A ὔ = (A | I ). This method is more e cient than the usual Kannan embedding lattice as discussed in Section 5.5.
The target short vector is now (s ‖ e) (as opposed to e as in the Kannan embedding case) which contains among its components those of s. Bai and Galbraith observe that this enables us to take advantage of the smallness of s (see [14] ). In particular, it is its smallness compared with the size of the error which is exploited. That is, where we have ‖s‖ ≪ ‖e‖, we may rescale the lattice into which the instance is embedded, increasing its volume. This increases the 0 which is required to solve the instance. In the case s ( ) ← {−1, 0, 1}, after an appropriate rescaling, the volume of the lattice is increased by , where = / 2 is approximately the standard deviation of the error. In the case s ( ) ← {0, 1} the volume is increased by (2 ) because we can scale by 2 and then rebalance. We note that (in the terminology of Section 5.5) Bai and Galbraith use = 1 rather than = ‖e‖. In our lemma below, we adapted their theorem to = ‖e‖. In our experiments we then use 
where = ὔ − = (log − log )/ log − .
Proof. We observe that scaling and rebalancing for a secret sampled from the interval [ , . . . , ] increases the volume by a factor of ( ) . Hence, by [14, Section 6.2] and assumption (3) we have a gap of roughly
Following the notation of [14] , let ὔ = + . By the same argument as in the discussion in Section 5.5
we have 2 / 1 ≥ ὔ . Again for simplicity we assume equality. By [14, Lemma 1] the optimal value of ὔ is ὔ = (log − log )/ log . Therefore we have
Taking logarithms and rearranging we get 1 − ὔ log + ὔ log( ) = ὔ log + log + log 4 .
Solving for log 0 : log 0 = ὔ log( / ) − log ( 4 ) + log − log ( / ) ὔ2 Substituting ὔ = (log − log )/ log : log 0 = (log − log )/ log log( / ) − log ( 4 ) + log − log ( / ) (log − log )/ log 2 1 = (log − log )/ log log( / ) − log ( 4 ) + log − log ( / ) log( / ) .
Solving for (log − log )/ log :
(log − log ) log = 2 log ( / ) − log log ( / ) − log ( 4 ) . Bai and Galbraith also observe that, perhaps counterintuitively, modulus switching does not improve their algorithm. This is because modulus switching results in a smaller rescaling factor and hence leaves a smaller gap.
. Small secret BKW
In this section we consider the small secret variant of BKW described in [8] . In this work is not speci ed but it is assumed that the s ( ) are chosen from {−1, 0, 1} or {0, 1}. The authors employ their own variant of BKW to achieve a complexity reduction for solving BKW with small secret. 
where in both cases 0 < ≤ 1 is a constant.
. Arora-Ge and Gröbner bases
We may exploit small secrets when reducing LWE to solving a non-linear system of equations as in Section 5.6. To encode that our secret is small, we add low-degree equations of the form ∏
−1 =0
− where is the cardinality of the support for and are the elements of the support. We may then expand the Hilbert series to establish the expected degree of semi-regularity.
Examples
In this section we use our estimator to estimate the cost of running the algorithms discussed in Sections 5 and 6 for parameter sets from the literature. Our estimator is available at [4] . We consider the following parameter sets.
• Regev: These are Regev's example choices for parameters from [70] . We use [9] to pick ≈ 2 and = 1/( 2 log 2 2 ).
• LindnerPeikert: We use [9] to select parameters as suggested in [52] given .
• FHE: Given and the multiplicative depth we set = 2 16.5⋅ +5.4 ⋅ 8 2 −3 ⋅ and = 3.2 2 / inspired by parameters suggested in [36] . We always assume s ( ) ← $ {0, 1}, which means our secret is a bit bigger than in [36] where the secret has Hamming weight /2 regardless of dimension.
In Tables 6-11 , "MitM" refers to the meet-in-the-middle algorithm given in Section 5.1, "BKW" to the BKW algorithm discussed in Section 5.2, "SIS" to the algorithm discussed in Section 5.3, "DEC" to the algorithm discussed in Section 5.4, "Kannan" to the algorithm discussed in Section 5.5, "Bai-Gal" to the algorithm discussed in Section 6.3 and "Arora-GB" to applying Gröbner basis algorithms as discussed in Section 5.6. In those tables concerning small secret variants, the same labels refer to the small secret variants of the respective algorithms.
The columns "bop" refer to estimated bit operations which we identify with CPU clock cycles. This identi cation slightly favours lattice reduction algorithms compared to other algorithms, because CPUs do more than one operation per bit per clock cycle. The columns "mem" refer to storage requirements of elements in ℤ . The columns " s, " refer to the number of calls to the LWE oracle. The columns "bkz2" resp. "sieve" refer to BKZ 2.0 estimates based on the row "enum" resp. "sieve" in Table 1 . We use the "bkz2" estimates to optimise parameters for lattice-based algorithms. The column "enum" gives the number of enumerations in the decoding stage of "DEC". The column "g" is the number of components that are guessed before running the respective algorithms as discussed in Section 6.1 (this only applies to small secret instances). All columns list the logarithm to base two of their respective values.
In all cases, costs are overall, i.e. we give an estimate for the overall cost of solving, including repeated trials and repeated guesses. If "-" is given instead of a number, it means our estimator did not return a value or was not run because it does not cover this particular case. This can happen when estimates only exist for special cases such as when applying Gröbner bases. We always use ὔ = 0.3 when considering Kannan embedding or the embedding by Bai and Galbraith. For each choice of parameter set and for each , we highlight the entry giving the runtime of the algorithm which runs fastest in that case.
Discussion
The problems of giving the concrete hardness of the LWE problem are manifold. No closed formulae. For most algorithms, there is no su ciently precise closed formula which expresses the running time in terms of the parameters specifying the problem (e.g., , , ), mainly due to a lack of a closed formula for lattice reduction as a function of 0 . This makes direct comparisons di cult. This problem is addressed by the Sage module, enabling us to estimate running times of the various algorithms for particular parameter choices. The results of applying this Sage module broadly agree with the literature. For example, by our estimates the parameter choices made in [36] are too conservative, as rst observed by van de Pol and Smart [77] , even in light of specialised algorithms exploiting the presence of a small secret (cf. Section 6.3). This is because their parameters were chosen assuming Lindner and Peikert's estimate for the runtime of BKZ, which we rule out from among the choices of estimates because it implies a subexponential algorithm for solving LWE. No single best algorithm. Our results indicate that there is not one algorithm which always outperforms all others on the parameter sets we tested, and so we cannot recommend to consider one particular algorithm to achieve security level . Which algorithm performs best depends on the concrete parameters considered. For small , DEC may be favourable (see, e.g., Table 7 ). For large , BKW may be fastest when considering public-key encryption (see, e.g., Table 6 ) but not when considering homomorphic encryption schemes which require large (cf . Tables 10 and 11) .
We note that while the Arora-Ge algorithm and its Gröbner basis variants always perform much worse than other algorithms in our tests, it is shown in [7] that this family of algorithms outperforms other families when considering a particular variant of LWE, i.e. UniformNoise-LWE instances.
Finally, we note that all families of algorithms discussed in this work permit parallelisation. For BKW we can distribute (partial) elimination tables across computing units and for the Arora-GB algorithm we can rely on parallelised linear algebra routines. Lattice reduction, too, can be easily distributed for the instances considered in this work, as we are running in the low advantage regime, i.e. we are computing many independent lattice reductions on fresh or re-randomised inputs. Time-memory trade-o s. According to our estimates of running BKZ, using sieving as the SVP oracle is faster than enumeration for large . While this is to be expected given that sieving is asymptotically faster than enumeration, it might be surprising to see the crossover already for dimension = 256 in some cases. It is important to note, however, that sieving would require an amount of memory so substantial that, for most parameters we consider, it is not clear that sieving is worth considering even where it is faster "on paper". A completely analogous statement can be made when considering the BKW algorithm or the Arora-Ge and its Gröbner basis variant. Indeed, all algorithms which achieve a time complexity of 2 O( ) also require memory of the order of 2
O( )
. An interesting open question is hence if an algorithm exists which solves LWE in 2 O( ) operations but requiring only poly( ) memory. Incomplete data. For, say, the decoding approach we are able to trade running time for success probability.
On the other hand, we do not know how to do this when using Kannan embedding. As highlighted in Section 5.5, for a success probability of 0.1 we have that ὔ ≈ 0.3 is a fair estimate based on experiments in the literature, but no data is publicly available from which to estimate ὔ for smaller success probabilities. While the decoding approach seems to outperform the application of Kannan embedding as highlighted in Example 5.20, by a similar argument, it is to be expected that the algorithm of Bai and Galbraith could be shown to produce better results if such data was available. This is just one area in which more data is required. Our estimator is built from the curves tted to the data from the literature given in Table 1 and as such more experimental data on the runtime of enumeration and sieving would allow to re ne these estimates. To reiterate, the analysis on which the estimator is based is sound given the current state of the art, but intrinsically depends on the formulae for sieving and enumeration, and so re nements in this area will re ne our estimator accordingly. As lattice reduction is a central step in many of the algorithms, this is of particular importance.
